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Abstract The presence of heterogeneity in treatment effects can create problems
for researchers employing a narrow experimental pool in their research. In particular
it is often questioned whether the results of a particular experiment can be
extrapolated outside the specific location of the study. In this article, we use a
population-based field experiment in order to test the extent to which treatment
effects for impersonal mobilisation techniques (direct mail and telephone) are
sensitive to where they are carried out (geography) and the context of the election in
which they were conducted. We find that on the whole it does not much matter
where an experiment is conducted: the treatment effects are to all intents and
purposes geographically uniform. This has important implications for the external
validity of get-out-the-vote field studies more generally, especially where single
locations are used. However, there is one important exception to this: experiments
carried out in high turnout locations at high salience elections may show larger
effects than those carried out in low turnout areas.
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Introduction
Get-out-the-vote (GOTV) field experiments have an important and long history in
political science, going back to Eldersveld 1956 study and before that to Gosnell’s
(1926). More recently, Gerber, Green and colleagues (Gerber and Green 2000a, b,
2001; Gerber et al. 2003; Green 2004; Green and Gerber 2008) have used
randomised control trials that show that face-to-face mobilisation has a strong effect
on voter turnout and is far more effective than less personal methods, such as
telephoning and direct mail (see also McNulty 2005). In a short space of time the
number of these experiments have increased dramatically, covering different
populations (adults, young people, different ethnic groups); mobilisation methods
(door-to-door, phone-banks, direct mail, leafleting, election-day mobilisation, robo-
calls, email, radio broadcasts, TV adverts, print media, and street signs); variations
in delivery (timing, tone, quality); partisan and non-partisan interventions; bilingual
or multilingual modes of delivery (see Green and Gerber 2008).1 Green et al. (2010:
3–4) note that in respect to direct mail alone ‘‘from 1999 through 2009, a total of 93
independent experiments were conducted, encompassing 127 treatments reported in
40 distinct studies’’. An increasingly important line of enquiry is the heterogeneity
of treatment effects. A number of studies have explored the conditions under which
treatment effects vary from population to population, from study to study and by
treatment design (Imai and Strauss 2011; Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Green
et al. 2012).
The presence of heterogeneity in treatment effects creates potential problems for
researchers employing a narrow experimental pool in their research. This is a
persistent critique of experimental studies: a lack of generalizability or external
validity (Mutz 2011). Whilst field experiments enjoy the advantage over laboratory
experiments that the treatments are tested in realistic settings, it is often questioned
whether the results of a particular experiment can be extrapolated outside the
specific location and to a generalised situation (Druckman and Kam 2011). Mutz
(2011) has argued that the traditional goal of internal validity need not be sacrificed
in the search for external validity if researchers adopt population based experimental
designs. However, because of the difficulty in carrying out large-scale field
experiments across large areas and over time, most GOTV studies have been
focused on a single area at a single election (or a small group of geographically
proximate locations) and for a single group of the electorate (notable exceptions
include Green et al. 2003; Nickerson 2006; Bennion and Nickerson 2010).
Meta-studies potentially allow researchers to compare treatment effects across
studies and draw inferences about generalised effects (Green et al. 2012). However,
the sheer variety of these kinds of experiments, encompassing variations in design
and mobilisation methods as well as target population, militates against general-
isation. A meta-analysis may suffer from a high degree of heterogeneity in various
elements of design, (Crombie and Davies 2009; DerSimonian and Laird 1986) a
problem for which there is no easy fix. When comparing studies, it is difficult (if not
impossible) to separate variation caused by the use of different mobilisation
1 See http://gotv.research.yale.edu for summaries of these approaches.
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methods from variation caused by unit or geographical heterogeneity. The challenge
is to design a study that can make population inferences in the presence of
heterogeneity.
Whilst a narrow experimental pool does not necessarily threaten causal inference,
if heterogeneity in treatment effects does exist, then to achieve valid causal
inference it is necessary to (a) sample some variation on the key moderating
variables; and (b) allow the treatment effect to vary, for example by including the
interaction of these moderating variables with the treatment effect (Druckman and
Kam 2011). But what are these key moderating variables? They could be in the
individual or unit characteristics such as political sophistication or demographic
characteristics. Here we focus on geographical or contextual factors. Elections are
highly heterogeneous across space and it is likely that treatment effects may vary
across different types of areas, for example those with high prevailing levels of
turnout compared to those with lower levels, or marginal as supposed to safe seats.
Whilst single location studies have the potential for examining variability in
treatment effects across different categories of elector, such as high versus low
propensity voters (e.g. Niven 2001), only studies with variance on all the relevant
dimensions of electoral context are capable of identifying the potentially crucial role
of local electoral context.
Given that we may theoretically expect heterogeneity across different political
contexts within a single country, then ideally we need a nationally representative
sample of voters across a sample of electoral districts and across different elections.
In this article, unlike any other previous GOTV studies of which we are aware, we
use such a design to test the extent to which treatment effects for impersonal
mobilisation techniques (direct mail and telephone) are sensitive to where they are
carried out (geography) and the context of the election in which they were
conducted. One of the considerable advantages of a nationally representative multi-
factorial design is that it renders possible the examination of the heterogeneity of
treatment effects across space. Of course there are other dimensions of heteroge-
neity which we cannot capture with a nationally representative population-based
experiment including variation by country, over time (beyond the two elections
sampled) and for different types of intervention. However, because the study is
based on a nationally representative sample of electors drawn from a random sample
of electoral districts (wards) we are able to explicitly test whether the effectiveness
of an impersonal nonpartisan intervention varies across different political contexts
measured on a number of different dimensions. These are selected because of their
potential theoretical relationship with treatment effects and are described in the
following section.
Underlying Level of Turnout
At the individual level, it has been noted that electors with a high underlying
propensity to vote are less likely to be swayed by a leaflet or phone call (Hillygus
2005). Conversely, those with a low underlying propensity to vote may be difficult
to persuade to change their mind (Niven 2001). Integrating these ideas, Arceneaux
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and Nickerson (2009) predict a curvilinear relationship between the individual level
underlying propensity to vote (or level of interest) and the efficacy of intervention
with the point of optimum efficacy depending on the salience of the election
(Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009). Thus, in low saliency elections it is relatively
high propensity voters who are more likely to be on the cusp of their personal voting
(or indifference) threshold. Extending this to the aggregate (constituency) level we
might expect that areas with middling levels of turnout are more likely to be
productive for campaigners than those with very high or very low levels, in medium
or high salience elections. In areas with very high levels of turnout, the average
propensity to vote is likely to be exceptionally high and many voters would vote
regardless of the intervention, except in low salience elections when more voters
may be close to their voting threshold. By contrast, in very low turnout areas it is
likely that electors, on average, are less susceptible to mobilization. In these areas,
the average latent propensity to vote is lower and, given that the treatment is likely
to raise this propensity by only a small amount, then the proportion that are raised
above a critical threshold is likely to be low, except when the election salience is
very high. In accordance with those who advocate the curvilinear argument,
‘‘GOTV efforts are likely to mobilize voters who fall in the middle of the voting
propensity spectrum’’ (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009: 3). By extension GOTV
campaigns may be likely to mobilise those living in areas of mid-level turnout,
though this may vary according to the saliency of the election (for example,
contrasting a European and General Election as we are able to do here). In other
words, we extend the logic of curvilinear contingent theory of turnout of Arceneaux
and Nickerson (2009) to apply to geographical electoral districts, and more
specifically the relationship between mobilization efficacy, the underlying or
prevailing level of turnout and election salience.
Electoral Competitiveness
The competitiveness of the electoral contest has a bearing on where a party or
candidate campaigns. Parties target campaign resources where the contest is close as
it is in these marginal seats where party activism it is likely to have highest potential
impact. A large body of literature shows that local party campaigns are effective at
mobilising party supporters (Denver and Hands 1997; Johnston and Pattie 2006;
Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008; Cutts 2006). Any non-partisan GOTV campaign must,
therefore, vie with other campaigns for the attention of voters. Where party
campaigns are intense, voters who are most likely to be persuadable by mobilisation
techniques may be mobilised by parties regardless of the intervention being studied.
In other words, the more marginal the seat, the more intense the party activism, and
the greater the likelihood that the experimental GOTV treatment is to be ‘‘drowned
out’’ by other interventions, since the control group will be likely to receive a large
amount of election information that has nothing to do with the experiment.
There are also alternative reasons why the electoral competitiveness of the seat
could drown out non-partisan GOTV effects. Those electors living in seats where
the contest is highly competitive are likely to be aware of the seat status, and as a
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consequence, more likely to have heightened levels of political awareness and have
greater local political knowledge. Of course, this in itself may be a function of
intensive party campaigning, but also other factors such as the media (old and new)
and more politicised social networks. The decision about whether to participate or
not is also more likely to be made in the knowledge that, unlike many electoral
contests in other places, it could have a bearing on the final outcome.
In this study there is a range of geographical areas which make it possible to
explore this relationship. Here we use a marginality variable—identifying those
seats where the margin is less than 10 %—which not only captures the intensity of
campaigns carried out by political parties but also reflects the higher levels of
political knowledge and interest among those electors living in seats where the
electoral contest is more competitive. Margin also has an additional advantage over
the use of a campaign measure such as party campaign spending, insofar as it is
easier to replicate in other contexts.
Party Control
As well as differing in respect to the prevailing level of turnout and the level of
competiveness, parliamentary constituencies vary in a number of other politically
relevant ways that may affect the efficacy of GOTV treatments. In general, such
factors reflect the character of the constituency in relation to the prevailing political
cleavages of the nation (Agnew 1987). The most important of these include the
socio-economic and demographic profile of the seat, its’ local political culture and
history, and the personal profile and support of local candidates. Given that, by their
very nature, these are all correlated with the popularity of each of the major political
parties; party incumbency provides a useful proxy for these sources of variation.
Thus, for example, the social profile of constituencies (whether it’s predominantly
working class or middle class) is highly correlated with the identity of the
incumbent party. Moreover, in any given election the nature of the campaign may
be shaped by whether the defending incumbent is from the governing party or the
opposition. For example, for any given level of competitiveness, because of the
relative unpopularity of the government at the time of the 2010 general election,
sitting Labour MPs were more likely to be under threat of losing their seat than
those of opposition parties. In order to capture these differences and to test for
potential biases among experiments carried out exclusively in government
controlled or opposition controlled seats, we split the sample according to whether
the incumbent MP was from the Labour Party (the governing party going into both
elections) or an opposition party.
The Electoral Context
Electoral turnout varies according to the electoral context (Marsh 2002; Franklin
2004; Fieldhouse et al. 2007). As noted above Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009)
argue that the point of optimum efficacy of a treatment will depend on the salience
of the election. Although plausible, there is limited hard-evidence that the salience
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of the election is systematically related to the size of treatment effects across
experiments. Green et al. (2010) for example, find no significant variation in
treatment effects by salience of election across 41 experiments carried out in the US.
In this study we are able to compare treatment effects for a second order (European)
election with a first order (general) election.
Following from above we test the following null hypotheses:
H0(1): Treatment effects do not vary significantly between electoral wards
(sampling units);
H0(2): Treatment effects do not vary with the prevailing level of turnout in the
ward;
H0(3): Treatment effects do not vary with the marginality/competitiveness of the
electoral district (constituency);
H0(4): Treatment effects do not vary with the party of the defending candidate;
H0(5): Treatment effects do not vary with the with the type of the election (general
versus European).
The Study
The study was designed to examine the effect of non-partisan mobilisation, through
telephone canvassing and direct mail, on voter turnout in the European elections in
England on June 4th 2009 and the UK General Election on May 6th 2010 (see
Fieldhouse et al. 2013). In a multistage design twenty-seven local authority districts
were randomly sampled and three electoral wards were randomly selected from each
sampled district. The sample of wards provided a close match to England as a whole
on a range of social and political characteristics.2 Using a database based on electoral
registers and telephone records, 40,000 individuals were sampled from these eighty-
one wards. By design all sampled wards contain individuals from treatment and
control groups in randomly distributed proportions. The sample was restricted to one
random person per household to avoid clustering, and to ensure households did not
receive double treatments. This sample was further stratified according to telephone
accessibility and therefore included two separate sub-samples made up of 26,500
telephone accessible electors (any record with a valid landline or mobile) and 13,500
individuals telephone inaccessible electors (anyone with no telephone contact
information). Each sampled telephone accessible individual was randomly assigned
to one of three treatment groups (telephone, mail, or mail and telephone) and
telephone inaccessible to the mail or control group. Because of the different
treatment combinations available and their different effectiveness, in the following
analyses we split by (or control for) telephone accessibility.
After the randomisation was complete, any electors in the sample (treatment or
control groups) that were not registered or not eligible to vote were removed,
2 Turnout rate in sample wards was 37.2 % compared to 35.1 % in England (2009 European Elections).
Turnout rate in 2010 in sample wards was 67.1 % compared to turnout rate in England (2010 General
Election) of 65.5 %. The sample of wards also represents England as a whole across a range of social and
demographic characteristics (see Appendix Table 6).
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leaving a sample of 25,293 in 2009. This reduction reflects redundancy in the
sampling frame particularly arising from non-registration (since we include only
registered electors in the analysis). At the General Election of 2010, we canvassed
the sample again, but with the difference that we randomly allocated a portion of the
2009 control group to a new mail and telephone treatment group. Members of the
three 2009 treatment groups were assigned to receive a repeat dose of the same
treatment in 2010. A proportion of the sample that was included in 2009 had left the
electoral register in 2010 or had changed name/address details and was therefore
excluded, leaving a sample of 21,984 in 2010. Further details of the study design are
reported in Fieldhouse et al. 2013).
The intervention consisted of a GOTV campaign called ‘Your Vote’ which
encouraged recipients of the treatment to vote for reasons of civic duty and
expressive motivation. Telephone recipients received a brief phone call from a team
of social science graduate students. Non-respondents were called back on at least
five occasions at different times of the day to maximise the overall contact rate. The
mail group received a personalised printed letter in a colour with almost identical
message (tailored for the written word).
The total number of registered electors in the samplewas 25,293 in 2009 and 21,984
in 2010. Of those in the telephone treatment group, 58 %were successfully contacted
in 2009 and 78 % in 2010 (Fieldhouse et al. 2013). Official records of voter turnout
were collected after both elections to verify the turnout of treatment and control
groups. In 2009, 17 %of electors in our sample voted by post, and 20 %did so in 2010.
As a result of electoral law, there is no public record that indicates whether,
individually, these people cast their vote and therefore postal voters are treated as
missing data and excluded from all analyses. Moreover, applications for postal vote
could not be influenced by the treatment as the closing date for applications (11 days
before polling day) had passed when the treatments were applied.
Results
Before examining whether there was any significant variation in treatment effects
between areas and across elections, we start by summarising the estimated treatment
effects for the GOTV experiment overall. In this paper we focus on the overall
intent-to-treat effect (ITT) as defined by the comparison of the sample assigned to
any treatment group and the control group, since this provides the largest available
sample, and therefore the best test of heterogeneity between geographic areas. The
ITT simply compares the treatment and control group on the basis of assignment. It
gives a conservative estimate of the average treatment effects, as it does not adjust
for non-contact. This approach is preferred here as contact rates were not available
for all treatment types.3 Table 1 shows the estimated ITT for the overall treatment
for 2009 and 2010 split by telephone accessibility.
In both elections, the overall treatment effect was positive but statistically
insignificant for the telephone inaccessible treatment group. In 2010 this largely
3 We cannot know whether or not mail treatments were read or not.
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reflects the lesser effectiveness of the mail treatment effect compared to the
telephone or combination effect, but in 2009 it also reflects a weaker mail effect in
the telephone inaccessible group (see Appendix Table 7). Amongst the telephone
accessible treatment group, the overall treatment effect was significant at both
elections. The largest effects were for those receiving the combined treatment and,
in 2010, for the telephone treatment.
Although Table 1 shows a larger effect in 2010 than in 2009, we cannot simply
compare the overall treatment effect at the two elections. To make this comparison
we must focus on the combination treatment (rather than the overall ITT), because
the mail and telephone separate treatments are not strictly comparable between
elections, as the 2009 mail and telephone groups were re-contacted in 2010. Table 2
therefore compares the effectiveness of the combination treatment across two
different elections. The comparison of 2009 and 2010 gives an excellent test of the
relevance of electoral context when comparing experiments, because the combi-
nation treatment was identical at both elections and carried out in exactly the same
geographic locations.
The 2010 election was a first order election with a high-level of salience and the
resultant level of turnout was much higher than in 2009 by a factor of two
(nationally turnout was 65 % in 2010 compared to 34 % in 2009). Whilst there is
reason to suppose the relationship between salience and the efficacy of GOTV
treatments will depend on individual propensities to vote (Arceneaux and Nickerson
2009), overall the low level of interest in 2009 and the disillusionment with party
politics prevalent at the time, appears to have limited the effectiveness of the 2009
Table 1 Intent to treat effects for overall treatment
2009 ITT (standard error) 2010 ITT (standard error)
Telephone inaccessible 1.03 (1.24) 2.00 (1.44)
N = 5,589 N = 4,222
Telephone accessible 1.37* (0.82) 2.87* (1.47)
N = 15,299 N = 13,256
ITT is equal to the percentage point difference in the turnout between those assigned to any treatment and
the control group. The standard errors = H(pq/n). P-values derived from standard comparison of pro-
portions z-test. Tests based on one-tailed test of significance as effects are hypothesised to be positive
* Significant at 0.05 (one-tailed test)
Table 2 Treatment effects for combined (mail and telephone) experiment, compared for 2009 and 2010
2009 2010
N treatment 2,287 2,120
N control 5,179 2,352
Voted (treatment) 957 1,545
Voted (control) 2,058 1,620
Estimated intent-to-treat effect % (standard error) 2.11 (1.23)* 4.00 (1.36)*
Difference in TE = 1.89 t-statistic = 1.03
* Significant at 0.05 (one-tailed test)
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treatment relative to 2010. However, the t-statistic for the difference in treatment
effects is not significant and therefore we cannot discount H0(5). In other words there
is no firm evidence that the treatment varies significantly between elections although
the direction and magnitude of the effects do indicate that the treatment may have
been more effective at the 2010 high salience election.
Comparing Between Areas and Within Elections
Figure 1 shows the relationship between ward turnout and the size of the overall
treatment effect for telephone accessible electors for each ward in 2010, depending
on the prevailing level of turnout in the ward, as measured by the turnout of the
control group in the ward at the previous election.4 Although each ward estimate is
based on small numbers, there appears to be a very weak relationship between the
Note. Previous turnout in ward in 2009 is derived from 2008 local election results, provided by Professor 
Michael Thrasher (The Elections Centre, University of Plymouth); and in 2010 from the control group turnout in 
2009.  
Fig. 1 Overall treatment effect for telephone accessible sample, 2009 and 2010 by percent turnout of
ward at the previous election
4 We cannot use contemporaneous turnout in the control group as the measure of underlying turnout
since this is used in the calculation of the treatment effect. Regression to the mean ensures that, by chance
alone (notwithstanding the treatment effect), where the control group turnout is higher we would
statistically be more likely to find a (comparatively) lower score for the treatment group. Therefore
subtracting the control group turnout from the treatment group turnout to give the treatment effect, other
things being equal, will give a negative slope coefficient. We therefore use turnout at the previous election
which is akin to using prior voting record at the individual level.
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underlying level of turnout and the treatment effect. In 2009 this relationship is
slightly negative and in 2010 slightly positive but the R-squared at both elections is
less than .01. This provides prima facie evidence that there is no strong or consistent
relationship between the prevailing level of turnout and the efficacy of the treatment
within a single election. In other words there is no systematic relationship between
the underlying turnout level and the effectiveness of the treatment.
Modelling Variation in Treatment Effects
Above we showed that there is a weak relationship between the local treatment
effect and the underlying level of turnout. However, although at the aggregate level
this was a large-N experiment, when disaggregated to ward level, the sampling error
around each individual ward estimate is quite large. In order to test the overall
significance of variation in the treatment effect between wards we use multilevel
(hierarchical) models, where vote is the dependent variable, and the independent
variable is the treatment assignment (hence we are estimating the ITT). The
hierarchical approach allows us test for variation in the level of turnout (the
intercept); the treatment effect (the slope) and more particularly the covariance of
the two. The covariance tells us whether the size of the treatment effect (the slope)
is correlated with the local level of turnout (the intercept). It also allows us to test
whether across the overall sample these random effects are statistically significant.
The hierarchical logistic models are fitted using MLwiN 3.2, with the estimates
for the model derived using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation
procedure (Browne et al. 2005). Snijders and Bosker (2011) state that it is common
to estimate hierarchical models using estimation methods based on marginal quasi-
likelihood (MQL) or penalized (predictive) quasi-likelihood (PQL) procedures.
However, when fitting binary response models, both of these quasi likelihood
estimators can lead to an underestimation of the random effects, particularly when
they are large and there are small numbers of observations within higher-level units,
as is the case with our sample (Browne et al. 2005; Goldstein and Rasbash 1996;
Rodriguez and Goldman 1995). Recent evidence also suggests that the Bayesian
estimation procedure (MCMC method with diffuse priors) is less biased than either
of the quasi-likelihood methods for binary response models (Browne et al. 2005).
Moreover, if there is any higher level variation we want to be sure we find it, so it is
imperative to use the MCMC approach.
Here, we used MLwiN software to estimate the starting values using first-order
PQL, then 5,000 runs to derive the desired proposal distribution (discarded after
convergence of the ‘‘burn in’’ period), followed by 50,000 simulated random draws
to obtain the final estimates. We use the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm and the
default diffuse gamma priors for variance parameters. The estimates in Table 3 are
based on the mean of the simulated values, and the significance is derived from the
standard error which is the standard deviation of the converged distribution. These
estimates correspond to the traditional maximum likelihood estimate and its
standard error.
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Table 3 shows the summaries of model results for the overall treatment effect,
comparing any person allocated to any of the three treatment groups with the overall
control group, regardless of whether they have telephone information or not.
Telephone accessibility is controlled for with a covariate in the model. The overall
treatment effects were statistically significant at the 5 % level in both elections, as
represented by the overall effect size. Looking at the random effects, turnout varies
significantly by ward at both elections, as represented by the intercept variance. This
is unsurprising, and simply reflects geographical variation in the underlying level of
turnout. What is more important is that there is no significant variance in the slope
(the treatment effect) in either 2009 or 2010. There is also no significant covariance
between the intercept and the slope, suggesting no systematic relationship between
the local treatment effect and the level of turnout. The analyses were repeated for
each of the separate experiments at both elections. In no instances across the two
elections and across any of the methods of mobilisation, either alone or in
combination, was there significant variance in the slope (the treatment effect), or the
co-variance of slope and intercept (the tendency to vary according to the turnout
rate).5 We therefore cannot reject H0(1) or H0(2).
It is possible to compare the relative effectiveness of different models—in our
case the baseline random intercepts model against the random slopes model—and
evaluate their goodness fit by using the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC)
(Spiegelhalter et al. 2002; van der Linde 2005). The DIC can be calculated from an
MCMC run by calculating the value of the deviance at each iteration, and the
deviance at the expected value of the unknown parameters. The DIC statistic also
accounts for the number of parameters in the model, with a difference of less than 2
between models suggesting no difference, while a difference of 10 or above
indicating an improvement in the goodness of fit (Burnham and Anderson 2002). A
comparison of the DIC with random slopes and without (random intercept only)
suggests there was no difference between the models for any of the treatments at
either election (see Appendix Table 10 for further details). In other words, there was
no improvement in model fit by relaxing the assumption that treatment effects are
equal across geographical areas.
Table 3 Multilevel MCMC Logistic Model Turnout with overall treatment
2009 Coef (SE) 2010 Coef (SE)
Effect size (treatment) 0.062* (0.031) 0.116* (0.046)
Intercept variance 0.165* (0.032) 0.117* (0.031)
Slope variance 0.005 (0.004) 0.019 (0.012)
Covariance 0.002 (0.010) 0.001 (0.016)
N 20,888 17,117
Telephone accessibility included as a control
* Significant at P B 0.05
5 See Appendix Tables 8 and 9.
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Sources of Variation
The multilevel models allowed us to test for overall variation in the treatment
effects and whether it varies with the overall level of turnout. We found no evidence
that it does either. However it may be possible that there is some variation along the
specific dimensions discussed above (electoral competitiveness and party control).
As noted by Druckman and Kam (2011) where there is a theoretical expectation of
heterogeneity in treatment effects we need sufficient variation in the key moderators
(in our case political context), which is achieved through the sampling of 81
geographical locations. However, for valid causal inference these moderators must
be interacted with the treatment. We test this by fitting fixed effect logit models with
interactions between treatment effects and indicators for each of the relevant
moderators. More specifically, we examine whether the impact of the intervention
on turnout varies with electoral competitiveness of the seat (marginality), party
control of the seat (Labour incumbency), and prior turnout (high, medium and low).
Whilst there are some potential problems in using models containing covariates to
adjust for imbalance (Bowers 2011), the model-based approach provides an
excellent approximation of randomisation-based differences of means (Green
2009).6 Moreover, there is no evidence of such imbalance in our sample and model
estimated average treatment effects are almost identical to unadjusted effects (see
Fieldhouse et al. 2013). The purpose of the models presented here is not to adjust for
covariate imbalance or improve the estimation of the ITT per se, but to estimate the
co-variation of the treatment effect and the contextual moderators defined above.7
As a check on the model based results, we also stratified the sample according to the
6 There has been much scholarly debate about the use of multiple regression to analyse experimental
data. The main argument is that the introduction of assumptions associated with multiple regression are
not justified by randomization and that the difference in means is the most appropriate estimator
(Freedman 2005). Green (2009) provides a robust defence for the use of multiple regression in
experimental analysis. Green (2009) uses a number of hypothetical examples and a voter mobilisation
mail experiment to show that the discrepancy between the average multiple regression estimate and the
true average treatment effect is negligible both in substantive terms and in relation to the standard error.
In summary, multiple regression provides accurate estimates and standard errors, and this is the case even
when the sample size is relatively small (Green 2009).
7 Green and Kern (2012) do, however, claim that some obstacles exist including the possibility of
specification error, multicollinearity when a large number of interaction terms are used and data-dredging
where the researchers search for treatment-covariate interactions until they discover ‘interesting’
heterogeneity for some subsets of experimental units. Here we use the multiple regression method
(inclusion of covariate and treatment-covariate interaction) as a method for estimating treatment effects
and argue, like Green (2009), that it is identical to the traditional way of calculating the difference in
means (splitting the sample). Our models carefully adhere to the set assumption. We explicitly test for
specification error (using the linktest command in STATA 12) and find no evidence of this in our models
(the _hatsq is insignificant, for instance in the incumbency model it has a P value of 0.28). We also find
no evidence of serious multicollinearity. Our models only contain one interaction so the concerns raised
(multiple interactions in the model) by Green and Kern (2012) is not valid in this case. Finally, the
saliency of electoral competitiveness, underlying turnout and party control on 2009/10 turnout is well
documented, not just here, but in the wider discipline and are selected for theoretical reasons.
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key contextual variables and calculated simple unadjusted treatment effects for the
relevant groups.8 These results are discussed further below.
Table 4 shows the overall treatment effect, the coefficients for two of the key
contextual variables (marginality and incumbency) and the interaction between
treatment effects and the contextual variable on turnout in the 2010 General
Election.9 Looking first at marginality, the overall treatment effect was statistically
significant at the 5 % level. As expected, the ‘margin’ main effect was significant.
Those individuals living in the most competitive seats were more likely to vote than
electors living in much safer seats. However, there was no evidence that the
treatment effects varied by the marginality of the seat. This was confirmed by
splitting the sample into marginal and non-marginal wards and estimating treatment
effects for the separate sub-groups (see Appendix, Tables 11, 12, 13). For both
telephone accessible and inaccessible, although treatment effects were larger (and
only significant) for non-marginal seats, the confidence intervals overlap, suggesting
the treatment effects do not differ significantly. Similarly, we find no evidence that
treatment effects vary by party control. People living in seats where there is a
Labour incumbent were less likely to turn out, hardly surprising given the socio-
economic characteristics of many of these constituencies and the electoral context
(with Labour as the governing party losing support). As a consequence, party
supporters in these areas where Labour were strong may have been less inclined to
participate. However, this did not have any bearing on the efficacy of the treatment,
and there is no significant interaction with the treatment effect. Again, this is
confirmed by the split sample analysis. As for marginality, for the telephone
accessible sample, the treatment was statistically significant in one group (non-
Labour incumbents seats) but not the other (Labour seats), but the two samples did
not differ statistically from each other. Given these findings, we therefore cannot
reject H0(3) and H0(4).
Table 4 Logit model of treatment effects and electoral competitiveness (margin) and labour incumbency
on turnout in the 2010 general election
Treatment (T) Main effect (X) T*X LL Cases
b SE Odds b SE Odds b SE Odds
Marginality (X1) 0.14* 0.05 1.15 0.27* 0.10 1.31 -0.11 0.07 0.90 -10,406 17,117
Labour
incumbency
(X2)
0.19* 0.08 1.21 -0.21 0.11 0.81 -0.12 0.09 0.89 -10,381 17,117
Models include telephone accessibility as covariate
LL log likelihood
* Significant P B 0.05. Robust standard errors clustered by constituency (N = 47)
8 There are alternative ways of estimating heterogeneity of treatment effects based on Bayesian statistical
decision theory (e.g. Imai and Strauss 2011).
9 We also tested the effects of party spending using both a dichotomous variable (high spending versus
low spending) and an overall spending measure obtained from the electoral returns of the three main
parties during the 2010 official election campaign period. We found that both measures of spending had
no significant effects reflecting the lack of variation in the spending variable.
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Table 5 shows the results of whether the treatment is related to prevailing
turnout—through the splitting of the sample according to whether the overall level
of turnout in the area is high, medium or low (allowing for a curvilinear
relationship). We used previous local election turnout for the 2009 model (as
defined in Fig. 1) and prior turnout in the 2009 European elections (from our control
group sample) in the 2010 model. Because the 2009 election was a second-order
low-salience election and the 2010 election was a first-order/high-salience election,
the underlying turnout rates were defined in relative terms with three equal; sized
categories at each election.10 Unsurprisingly, in both 2009 and 2010, those
individuals living in higher and medium turnout areas were significantly more likely
to vote than those living in low turnout areas. Of more significance were the findings
of the interaction between the treatment intervention and the local prevailing level
of turnout. In 2010 (but not 2009) the overall treatment, had a significantly greater
impact in high turnout areas. The split sample analysis (for the telephone accessible
sample) also shows a larger effect in high turnout areas, though the confidence
intervals do overlap (see Appendix Tables 11, 12).11 The greater efficacy of the
intervention in high turnout areas, at the high salience general election (where
overall turnout was 65 %), is consistent with an individual level phenomenon of
maximum treatment effects for high propensity voters (e.g. Green 2004). By
Table 5 Logit model of treatment effects and prior turnout on turnout in the 2009 European elections
and the 2010 general election
Treatment 2009 2010
B SE Odds B SE Odds
Overall treatment 0.08 0.06 1.08 -0.02 0.06 0.98
High turnout 0.62* 0.07 1.86 0.42* 0.14 1.52
Mid turnout 0.33* 0.06 1.39 0.24* 0.11 1.27
T*High turnout 0.00 0.09 1.00 0.24* 0.10 1.27
T*Mid turnout -0.05 0.08 0.95 0.15 0.09 1.15
Log likelihood -13775.22 -10339.62
N 20888 17,117
Models include telephone accessibility as a covariate
LL log likelihood
* Significant P B 0.05. In all models, robust standard errors clustered by ward (N = 81). In 2009,
Turnout is categorised on the basis of prior turnout in local elections (2006, 2007 and 2008). In 2010,
Turnout is a categorical variable—high, mid and low—and is based on the 2009 European election
GOTV sample (for each ward in the sample)
10 In 2009 low turnout is defined as\32 %, mid turnout 32–45 % and high turnout[45 %. In 2010 low
turnout is defined as\32 %, mid turnout 32–42 % and high turnout[42 %.
11 Examination of the separate experiments (telephone, mail combi etc.) also supports this. None of these
experiments showed a significant treatment effect in low turnout areas. However, in a number of cases the
interactions with high turnout were significant, indicating significant treatment effects in high turnout
areas. In 2010, both the double combination treatment and the new combination treatment showed a
significant impact on turnout in higher turnout areas. A similar finding was found for the telephone
treatment in 2009.
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contrast, there is little support for the aggregate level equivalent of the (contingent)
curvilinear theory (cf. Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009) which would predict the
largest treatment effects in high-turnout areas in 2009 (a mid-salience election
where the average turnout is around 50 % in high turnout wards) or in mid-turnout
areas at the high salience 2010 election (again, where average turnout is around
50 %). However, it should be remembered that we are testing an aggregate level
theory concerning the underlying level of turnout in the area, so we are not making
any claim about the veracity of the individual level curvilinear theory, only that it
does not appear to apply at the aggregate level in the way hypothesized.
Overall, there was some limited evidence that the treatment effects varied with
the prevailing level of turnout in the area, with the treatments being very slightly
more effective where turnout was already high in a high salience election.
Conclusions
The nationally representative sample allowed us to explore geographical variations in
the effect of the treatment across twoverydifferent elections. Thismulti-factorial design
not only allowed us to examine the heterogeneity of treatment effects but also to make
comparisons between the treatments as applied to different sections of the population.
We examined one theoretically important source of potential variability, namely
heterogeneity across space.More specifically whether the treatments effects were equal
across different types of area, those where a party was in control, where the seat was
competitive and those areas with high prevailing levels of turnout compared to those
with lower levels.Weproposed a number of null hypotheseswhich explicitly tested this.
The findings were largely consistent. First, there was no conclusive evidence that
the treatment varied significantly between elections, though there was some indicative
evidence that the treatment was more effective in the high salience first order election
of 2010. Second, there was no significant variation in the treatment effect across
geographical areas. In 2009 and 2010, whilst turnout varied by ward (the intercept
variance) there was no significant variance in the slope (the treatment effect) in any of
themultilevel models.We then testedwhether there was any variation in the treatment
effects along specific dimensions including party control, the electoral competitive-
ness of the seat, and the prevailing level of turnout in the area. There was no evidence
that the treatment effects varied significantly by the marginality of the seat or by party
control. However, there are two significant caveats to this conclusion. First, whilst
overall variation was largely insignificant, and the estimation of split sample
treatment effects showed that subgroups did not generate statistically significant
differences to each other, there were a number of instances where the ITT for some
subgroups were statistically significant to zero and others were not (non-marginal
sets, non-Labour incumbent seats and high turnout seats). This suggests that selection
of geographic location can make a difference as to whether significant effects are
uncovered or not, especially where effects are close to the threshold of statistical
significance. Second, in 2010 the overall treatment had a significantly greater impact
on turnout in high turnout areas. Just as some previous research has shown, treatments
may be more effective amongst regular previous voters (Green 2004; Niven 2001). At
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the aggregate level our GOTV treatments did appear to be more effective in higher
turnout areas, in the higher salience general election. This is consistent with an
individual level inference that it may be easier to nudge those already likely to vote,
than it is to change the mind of ardent non-voters. However, our results relate to the
characteristics of areas, not voters, so it is more accurate to say that campaigning may
be most effective in high turnout locations at higher salience elections.
Notwithstanding this, overall it seems, taking the geography of treatment effects
as a whole, it does not matter too much where an experiment is conducted: the
treatment effects are to all intents and purposes uniform. This has important
implications for the external validity of GOTV field studies more generally,
especially where single locations are used (which lack of variation on key
contextual moderators). It is possible to use these findings to conclude that the
effects of single-location GOTV experiment can be extended to a wide range of
locations (within a single election) without serious threat to causal validity.
However, researchers should be warned that experiments carried out in high turnout
locations are likely to show larger effects than those carried out in low turnout areas.
Similarly campaigners might be interested to know that an additional leaflet or
telephone call in a high turnout area may be more effect than the same leaflet in a
low turnout area – though of course the additional voters may be less likely to be
pivotal in those areas. Whilst these findings are important for researchers and
campaigners alike, we should stress there are unanswered questions, not least
whether larger samples or different electoral contexts might throw up more
statistically significant patterns of variation. Future work based on meta-data could
test whether the heterogeneity in existing studies conforms to the patterns found
here. Beyond that, a nationally representative sample from other countries including
the US is the natural next step, to compare findings with this British study.
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Appendix
See Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13
Table 6 Comparison of sample ward characteristics and England population (2001 census data)
% England Sample ward mean
White british 90.9248 87.8559
Black 02.3047 02.9522
Asian 04.5754 07.1857
Muslim 03.1032 05.0652
Sikh 0.6662 0.6845
Hindu 1.1131 1.4300
Economically active 66.8599 65.3208
Economically inactive 33.1401 34.6792
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Table 7 Intent to treat effects for original experiments
Mail (tel.
inaccessible
Mail (tel.
accessible)
Telephone Combined Repeat
combined
2009 ITT (standard
error)
1.03 (1.27) 1.60 (1.01) 0.60
(1.08)
2.11*
(1.23)
–
2010 ITT (standard
error)
1.99 (1.50) 1.72 (1.20) 3.36*
(1.25)
4.00*
(1.36)
3.01* (1.38)
* Significant at 0.05 (one-tailed test)
Table 8 Multilevel MCMC logistic model of 2009 turnout with treatments
Treatment Effect size Intercept variance Slope variance Covariance Cases
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Combi (mail ? tel) 0.097 0.054 0.202* 0.044 0.017 0.014 -0.036 0.023 7,466
Telephone 0.029 0.046 0.178* 0.039 0.005 0.007 -0.009 0.015 8,645
Mail (tel accessible) 0.068 0.045 0.199* 0.042 0.011 0.011 -0.010 0.018 9,546
Mail (inaccessible) 0.066 0.058 0.143* 0.038 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.012 5,589
All Maila 0.068 0.036 0.166* 0.033 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.012 15,135
a Includes telephone accessibility as covariate
* Significant at P B 0.05
Table 6 continued
% England Sample ward mean
Employed in agriculture 1.4772 1.3194
Employed in manufacturing 14.8316 15.5060
National socio-economic classification class 1 or 2 8.6118 7.9903
National socio-economic classification class 7 or 8 20.6671 20.8256
Never worked 1.0124 3.3632
Long-term unemployed .7321 1.0814
Full time students 5.2467 7.0906
Households with 2 cars 23.5611 22.3803
With limiting long-term illness 17.9272 26.6337
Single parents 6.4151 9.5903
With no educational qualifications 28.8519 30.5522
With level 4 or 5 qualifications (at least college) 19.9033 19.3940
Owner occupiers 68.7195 67.3057
Aged 18–29 15.0572 15.6438
Aged 30–59 41.5297 41.1189
Aged 60? 20.7572 21.1440
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Table 9 Multilevel MCMC logistic model of 2010 turnout with treatments
Treatment Effect size Intercept variance Slope variance Covariance Cases
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Combi (mail ? tel) 0.189* 0.073 0.103* 0.040 0.058 0.040 -0.035 0.032 4,374
Double combi 0.149* 0.070 0.166* 0.045 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.015 4,261
All combi 09 ?10 0.176* 0.058 0.136* 0.037 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.010 6,330
Telephone 0.161* 0.062 0.127* 0.036 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.012 5,234
Mail (tel accessible) 0.069 0.067 0.103* 0.039 0.078 0.044 -0.025 0.033 6,010
Mail (inaccessible) 0.065 0.070 0.132* 0.047 0.025 0.021 -0.042 0.026 4,153
All maila 0.075 0.050 0.113* 0.033 0.035 0.022 -0.019 0.022 10,163
* Significant at P B 0.05
a Includes telephone accessibility as covariate
Table 10 Comparison of deviance information criterion for each treatment in 2009 and 2010: random
intercepts models and random slope models
Random intercepts model only Random slope
2009 Treatment groups
Overall treatment 27147.09 27148.26
All Mail 19541.21 19542.34
Mail Accessible 12576.09 12577.24
Mail Inaccessible 7011.67 7012.01
Combi 2009 9858.66 9858.27
Telephone 11390.30 11390.30
2010 Treatment groups
Overall treatment 20525.39 20525.44
All mail 12526.86 12526.43
Mail accessible 7269.51 7266.72
Mail inaccessible 5298.22 5297.28
All combi 7485.00 7485.15
Combi 2010 only 5235.10 5235.34
Double combi 5090.54 5090.14
Telephone 6226.67 6226.75
Table 11 Split sample treatment effects 2009
Telephone accessible Telephone inaccessible
High
turnout
Med
turnout
Low
turnout
High
turnout
Med
turnout
Low
turnout
N in the treatment group 1,190 6,814 2,116 394 1,921 808
N in the control 622 3,491 1,066 296 1,637 534
N voted in the treatment
group
588 2,845 727 157 679 216
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